Avicenna on Induction.Doc Essay Example

Avicenna on Induction.Doc Essay Example Avicenna on Induction.Doc Essay Avicenna on Induction.Doc Essay Avicenna on Induction M. A. Ejeii University of Isfahan ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to discuss Avicennas deductive justification of induction. The paper introduces Avicennaâ„ ¢s theory of induction as a post-falsificationist theory of his time, and then proceeds to discuss a distinction he has made between induction and experience. The paper then discusses the theory and focuses on some of the problems related to Avicennaâ„ ¢s claim that our belief in inductive generalization is based on a deductive structure, and differentiates it from a view criticized by Hume. The paper ends up with a short comparison of what Avicenna, Hume and Ayer say on the kind justification in question. Keywords: Avicenna, Ayer, Hume, Induction, Experience, deductive justification, Principle of Plenitude. Introduction Inductive reasoning is discussed in almost all Avicennaâ„ ¢s logical works.[1] But his most detailed discussion of induction occurs in his encyclopedic work Al-Shifa (The Healing), in Kitab al-Burhan (Book of Demonstration). For the purpose of our current discussion it is important to note that, prior to Avicennaâ„ ¢s time, there had been some philosophical discussion of the problem of induction, and various attempts to find justification for inductive knowledge. Among these theories there had also existed a falsificationist view to which Al-Farabi (d. 950/51), Avicennaâ„ ¢s predecessor, adhered. The following excerpt, which the writer found in one of his logical works, corroborates the point: And there are some others who wanted to validate (tas-hih, making sound/correct) the major premise through induction, but when they found that induction is inadequate for that purpose, a point, which we have frequently made in what we said before, they rejected induction as a means for justifying that premise, and used it instead to falsify it.[2] Now, one can safely assume that Avicenna had been quite familiar with the views of his well known predecessor and the kind of critical approach to the problem of induction that al-Farabi is talking about, As a result, Avcennaâ„ ¢s own treatment of the problem can be seen as comparable to that of the post-falsificationist theorists of our own time. Thus his suggestions can be found relevant to current discussions of the problem and contribute to discussions. Unfortunately there is no further reference to, and information on this topic in al-Farabiâ„ ¢s extant works, but assuming Avicennas familiarity with those discussions and works, his treatment of the problem can be seen comparable to the post-falsificationist theorists of our time, that in their treatment of induction have reverted to concepts of causality and essences. [3] 1. Experience vs. Induction Avicennaâ„ ¢s deductive justification of induction Inductive reasoning is discussed in almost all Avicennas logical works. But his most detailed discussion of induction occurs in his encyclopedic work Al-Shtfa (The Healing), in Kitab al-Burhan (Book of Demonstration). The cornerstone of Avicennas theory of inductive reasoning is a distinction he makes between experience and incomplete induction. According to him experience is a rationally justified procedure, while (incomplete) induction is not. In Al-Najat (Deliverance) he defines induction as a judgment about a universal, inasmuch as it is realized in its particularsâ„ ¢.[4] The definition is intended to cover both complete and incomplete induction in their Aristotelian sense. Hence Avicenna immediately proceeds to divide induction thus defined into two kinds, complete and incomplete: either in all particulars, which will be a complete induction, or in some of them, and this will be an incomplete inductionâ„ ¢. The undivided sense is in agreement with Aristotleâ„ ¢s definition of induction as stated in Topics, i.e. a passage from individuals to universalsâ„ ¢. It also accords with induction as discussed in Prior Analytics, i.e., a passage from all the species of a genus to a generalization about the genus itself.â„ ¢ The inadequacy of incomplete induction is emphasized in almost all of Avicennaâ„ ¢s logical works. Here is a quotation from his Daneshnameh (Book of Knowledge): And when those who indulge in inductive reasoning observe that many or most cases are of a certain attribute, they conclude that all are so. But the conclusion does not necessarily hold true, since it may be that the unobserved instances are contrary to the observed ones, and while a hundred thousand instances agree, yet there may be another that doesnâ„ ¢t. This is exemplified by the case of crocodile, which moves its upper jaw [when chewing], and not its lower one.[5] Having rejected (incomplete) induction as a means of justifying empirical generalizations, Avicenna, instead describes a partially similar procedure which he calls experienceâ„ ¢. While by definition not a species of deduction, experience, nevertheless, exhibits a deductive structure. In short, the process of attaining certainty in empirical generalizations, according to Avicenna, starts with the observation of particulars, and then reaches its conclusion through a deductive mode of thought, a deduction that elsewhere calls concealed (or imperceived) deduction.[6] It is due to the introduction of this deductive mode that experience differs from induction and the conclusion of an inductive reasoning is in fact justified. But what exactly is this concealed or imperceived inference Avicennas characterization suggests a natural explanation. However, in order to explain the details it will be convenient to rely as much as possible on Avicennas texts. This, of course, calls for lengthy quotations, but due to the importance of the point in question the reader, hopefully, will find it rewarding. In the following quotation Avicenna first illustrates the difference between induction and experience by an example, and then discusses some objections to, and possible misunderstandings of, his method he experience and the concealed inference involved. So let us start with his argument for the method of experience: Experience, however, is different from induction. And we shall soon explain what the difference consists in. Experience is like drawing the conclusion: scammony is purgative of bile. Surely when that happens frequently enough, it cannot any longer be considered as a matter of coincidence. So we make the judgment that it is in the nature (Shaâ„ ¢n) of scammony to be purgative of bile, and we are assured of that. [7] Further down, on the same page, but in another connection, Avicenna states the same argument in slightly different words: When it is verified repeatedly that the purging of bile follows the administration of scammony, we will conclude that this cannot be regarded as a matter of coincidence. Since what is coincidentally true cannot occur always or frequently. Thus we conclude that it is caused by scammony. The above argument uses as its major premise the principle What is true as a matter of coincidence cannot occur always or frequentlyâ„ ¢. This premise together with the frequently observed fact that administration of scammony is followed by the purging of bile, yields the conclusion: scammony is purgative of bile. The argument is thus, a hypothetical syllogism and has the form of: (1) p ( ~ q, ~ ~ q, /( ~ p The argument (1) is a deductive one, but it is not to be confused with another argument, also called deductive, discussed often in the literature, and propounded first by Hume in order to criticize it. We shall discuss that argument in part 3 below. The argument (1) also called concealed or imperceived deduction, lies at the ground of our belief in empirical generalizations. Now for example, when under the familiar same circumstances a sufficient number of cases of administration of scammony were followed by purging of bile, due to the concealed argument (1) with the major premise What is true as a matter of coincidence cannot occur always or frequentlyâ„ ¢ results in the conclusion Scammony is purgative of bileâ„ ¢. The first premise says if things did occur as a matter of coincidence then it would not be that they occur always or frequentlyâ„ ¢. Now, negating the consequent (canceling double negation) we shall have: therefore the course of events in question is not a matte r of coincidenceâ„ ¢, i.e., Scammony is purgative of bile. Thus, when a sufficient number of observations made of the administration of scion being followed by purging of bile, or that water boils when heated to a certain temperature, then under the conditions described below in part 2, on the ground of general principle of causation and in the form of Modus Tollens one concludes the generalization that `Scammony is purgative of bile`, or ` water boils when heated to a certain temperature`. Avicennaâ„ ¢s example is a typical causal law, i.e., a law that mentions a cause and an effect. It, however, can be easily generalized to the so called functional relationship, like the one which exits in the gas law in its classic form, and which establishes a relation between the volume, temperature, and (external and internal) pressure of a gas. The general form of the concealed argument, of course, remains the same as in (1). It seems to me, though I will not argue it here, that the principle that whatever is true as a matter of coincidence cannot occur always or frequentlyâ„ ¢ is related somehow to the Principle of Plenitude according to which everything that is possible will also some time come true. Avicenna seems to be committed to this principle in Al-Shifa. In that book he always equates possibility with being sometimes true and necessity with being always true.[8] However there is another suggestion for the origin of the principle. Professor Weinberg has suggested that the principle is directly derived from Aristotle. Professor Weinberg does not mention any reference to Aristotleâ„ ¢s works, but his suggestion is supported by Aristotleâ„ ¢s text in his discussion of the four causes, in Physics, II, where he talks about chance and spontaneity. I shall return to this issue in the appendix. 2. Explanation and Further Elucidation We shall now turn to a question that is essential to Avicennaâ„ ¢s theory of induction, and of which he is concerned to clear up some possible confusion. Here again I shall quote first a passage in which he summarizes his method from the end of his discussion in al-Shifa, and then explain various points he makes by adding further details. In the quotation that follows the numbers have been inserted to demarcate the different elements of his theory. He writes: What we are saying is this: [1] Often, as a result of experience, we find ourselves in a state of certainty, and we want to explicate the circumstances under which the certainty is attained. [2] This happens when we are assured that nothing accidental is taken into account, and [3] this in turn will be the case when the properties of the object are known to us, and [4] we find out that when the object exists some other thing always or often follows, and that when the object does not exist, that other thing does not follow either.[9] [1] makes it explicit that Avicenna is not skeptic about the possibility of knowledge. Thus his aim is the central goal of doing philosophy of science, i.e., to explain and validate scientific knowledge. In his words the question is, under what circumstances the state of certainty in scientific knowledge is attained [2] and [3] are essential to his view and state the circumstances under which the generalizations are arrived at and lead to certainty. The term accidental, as it occurs in [2], is used in its widest sense, meaning, not causing the effect. As an example of this, he mentions a generalization about scammony being purgative of bile, when the plant is grown in certain countries, but not in others. According to him, the generalization fails because something accidental to the situation is mistaken for what is essential. He writes: Thus nor do we deny that scammony may acquire, or lack, some specific nature or characteristic in some regions such that it may not be purgative of bile. Rather the experiential judgment must be as follows: the scammony of the kind known to us at present, and through our senses, is, by its nature, or because of a certain property in it, purgative of bile, unless an impediment intervenes. [10] In other words the generalization is not about scommony absolutely or under any condition, it is rather about the kind presently known to us, and through our senses. The argument is that if scammoy under such and such condition were not purgative of bile, this would not have happened often or regularly. The conditions include for example the property of being scammony grown in some specific region, and not just being scammony. He offers a similar explanation when he discusses another counterexample adduced by a critic. The counterexample has resulted from an imagined observation made in Sudan, where it is supposed that no other men but the colored are in sight and they are the only people that appear to the senses. Upon repeated observations, the critic continues, one should conclude the false generalization that All men are coloredâ„ ¢. Discussing this counterexample, Avicenna explains the observation here is not being carried out just among human beings, as is implied by the con clusion, but among human beings under such and such conditions, or from such and such parents.. He writes: In short, if by birth is taken [to mean] as being born of colored people, or born in such and such a country the experiential judgment will hold true. But if the conclusion is taken generally, i.e. as being born of people, then the conclusion will not hold with regard to the particulars referred to. For the experience has been carried out among colored people and not just among people, and these two are not the same things.[11] Thus [2] constitutes Avicennaâ„ ¢s diagnosis for all cases in which experience leads to error, These are cases in which something accidental is taken into account, namely what is not really a cause is taken as a necessary or a sufficient condition for the phenomenon in question. However, he mentions that if the characteristic is coextensive with the one under investigation, the conclusion will hold in connection with it also. It is for this reason and other disturbing conditions that Avicenna is prepared to accept that experience can sometimes lead to error: We never maintain that experience is immune from error, and that it always leads to certainty. How can that be maintained, while even syllogistic inferences are not exempt from error[12] In order to arrive at elements that are essential to a causal connection, (3) is introduced. According to (3), to achieve a correct generalization the properties of the object must be known to us. This is required in order to determine the properties from whose existence the effect follows, and also to eliminate the possibility of there being some other factors that are essential but not taken into account. The certainty will obtain to the extent that we are assured the initial conditions obtain and are the same as those that existed in our observations. This of course will not affect the deductive structure of inductive reasoning described earlier. [4] states the concealed deduction. The central question about the major premise is, is that proposition analytic or synthetic To complete our discussion of the state of Avicennaâ„ ¢s deductive justification of inductive generalizations, two further points must be discussed. The first concerns the indispensability of deduction in inductive generalizations, and the second pertains to the hypothetical nature of generalizations thus arrived at. Avicenna evidently does not here mean that inductive generalization is purely a deductive process, but only that without the deduction generalization will not be formed. He writes: It is not by reason of the frequency of the observed instances alone that the universal judgment in question is formed, but rather as a result of frequently observed effect, together with the deduction we have just mentioned.[13] The above point is important, since some people think that the deduction in question is not needed.[14] Avicenna flatly rejects the idea that induction is purely enumerative or self-supporting. The above point is the basis of his whole theory of experience. Another point is the kind of relevance the concealed deduction bears to experiential generalization. According to Avicenna if the deduction were not to be formed, the certainty invested through observation would not be imparted to the conclusion. A next point concerns the hypothetical nature of inductive generalization obtained; the conclusion itself is hypothetical and not categorical. As a limitative aspect of his experiential method, Avicenna is much concerned to point out that the generalities thus arrived at are not absolute, but conditional, conditional upon the existence of the circumstances in which observations have been carried out. It follows, that the subsequent application of the laws in question will hold true only in cases where the circumstances under which the generalization is made obtain. Such laws, then, will not take the simple form, If x is an instance of scammony, then, given that it is prescribed, it will be purgative of bile, but the much more restrictive form: If x is an instance of the scammony of the kind k observed in this region which is here and now present to our senses, then, given k, it will be purgative of bile, unless an impediment intervenes. This in part is to ensure that the condition (2) holds. In this connection Avicenna writes: The judgment will hold universally only under those conditions in which the experience is being made, and the frequently observed property of the object will pertain to the nature of the object permanently only in the region in which the observation has been carried out. And that will be the case unless an impediment intervenes. Thus the universal judgment formed through experience will hold true under these conditions, and not absolutely.[15] But isnâ„ ¢t the condition only in the region ¦Ã¢â€ž ¢ too restrictive In other words, does not the condition make the conclusion unduly restricted in scope, and thus quite unsuitable to be used as a premise in demonstrative sciences The answer is that the conclusion will not be restricted in scope in the sense in which the statement all the hair on my head is blackâ„ ¢ is. Rather it is restricted in the sense that the statement all hair having the same condition the hair on my head has, is blackâ„ ¢ is restricted. In fact, he wants to see generalizations thus obtained as supported by corresponding true counterfactuals. He writes: However if the subject matter is of a specific nature, then the specific quality may be what has been effective in the majority of instances available to us in our observations. This will no doubt prevent the conclusion from being unrestrictedly general, and requires it to be more specific with regard to the nature of the things observed. Failure to see this point can make the result of experience erroneous with respect to generality. Although in cases like that we are assured that an object, which is so and so will be such and such, we are never assured that, if any thing is so and so then it will be such and such.[16] 3. A Note on a Criticism of Deductive Justification of Induction. An objection has been sometimes raised against a version of deductive justification that differs fundamentally from the one discussed by Avicenna. The version in question is first discussed by Hume in order to criticize it. It uses the principle that Nature is uniform as its major premise. Ayer raises an objection to Hume suggestion and argues that if the deduction thus formed is accepted it can prove too much, and it would have unexpected consequences. We shall briefly discuss Ayerâ„ ¢s objection in order to show that Avicennaâ„ ¢s deductive justification is not open to this kind of criticism. A. J. Ayer in his Probability and Evidence, discussing various stages of Humeâ„ ¢s skeptical argument, at a certain stage finds himself obliged to part company with himâ„ ¢. This is where Hume, discussing the problem we are dealing with, holds that to make an inductive conclusion valid we need as an extra premises the principle that instances of which we have had no experience must resemble those of which we have had experience and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the sameâ„ ¢. Ayer adds: The obvious objection is that a principle so general as the one that Hume advocates cannot possibly do the work that is here required of it. We cannot validate the inference form all observed As are Bs to All As are Bs by adding as a major premises Nature is uniform`. The syllogism `Nature is uniform`, `All hitherto observed swans have been white`, therefore `All swans are white` is not to be rejected as John Stuart Mill maintained, just because the minor premise turned out to be false and so landed us with a false conclusion. It was invalid all along.[17] Ayerâ„ ¢s contention here is that the syllogism `Nature is uniform`, `All hitherto observed swans have been white`, therefore `All swans are white` is not invalid either because its major premise is false as Hume thinks, or because its minor premise is false as Mill says, but because the syllogism is formally invalid. Given that the universe is uniform and that All hitherto observed swans have been whiteâ„ ¢ it would not logically follow that `All swans are white`. Thus the argument is to be rejected not because some of its premises are invalid, but because the inference has not a valid form. Ayer continues: But of course such discoveries are not taken as refuting the uniformity of nature. They are taken only as proving that the uniformities that nature exhibits are in some respects different from what we had supposed them to be. Not `All swans are white` but `All swans are nonchromatic`, or, All swans are white under such and such conditionsâ„ ¢, or black, under such and such other conditions.[18] These few lines are in complete agreement with what Avicenna has to say in the presence of a falsifying situation. The discovery of non-colored human beings was explained by saying that being born of human parents is not a sufficient condition for a newly born human being to be colored. It is interesting to note that the language and the example used here by Ayer are pretty much the same as the ones used by Avicenna : Ayer uses the example here to refute the deductive justification of induction, but Avicenna uses his example to remove a possible misunderstanding concerning his proposed method. According to Avicenna the conclusion is false not because its major is false, but because the conditions under which the observations are made are not taken into account in the conclusion. Here Ayer seems to interpret uniformity of natureâ„ ¢ in its weak sense, while as it is obvious from the context of Millâ„ ¢s argument, he actually uses the phrase in a stronger sense, in which it means uniformity under the specific circumstances where the experience is madeâ„ ¢. Leaving this point aside, to be sure, Ayer is right in holding the deductive generalization cannot be validated by adding as its major premises Nature is uniform`, since this would not be a valid argument form. In contrast, the deduction described by Avicenna is of Modus Tollens form, and valid. Its major premise is based on a general principle of causation to the effect that every event has a sufficient cause. The generalizations thus obtained are of course, According to Avicenna, not absolute and unconditional, but restricted and hypothetical. To return to the example Ayer discusses, the correct generalization would not be: All swans are whiteâ„ ¢, but All swans begotten from white parent swans are whiteâ„ ¢, etc.. According to Avicenna, when this condition is not satisfied, the experience can only yield probable judgmentâ„ ¢.[19] A similar point can be made in connection with Humeâ„ ¢s remark when he writes, The bread which I formerly ate nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers. But does it follow that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers The consequence seems nowise necessary. Avicenna would agree that the consequence is not necessary. As in the case of his own examples, the universal judgment, he would say, will hold true only under certain conditions, and not absolutely. In the case of Humeâ„ ¢s specific example Avicenna would say, it is not just a body of such sensible qualities absolutely and without further qualification that would be taken as attended by the power of nourishment, but along with it there are some other conditions that are determined and operative. These conditions may be partially or even wholly unknown to us and neglected, and this explains why experience sometimes errs. As we noted in part 2, Avicenna said that the conclusion (about scammony) will follow if it is restricted to the scammony grown in certain countries, and is of the kind known to us at present. According to him, the generalization fails because something accidental is mistaken for what is essential. This was the same point made by Ayer about what has gone wrong with the generalization All swans are white. Appendix At the end of chap. 4 of his Physics, II, Aristotle proposes to discuss the question what chance and spontaneity areâ„ ¢, and asks whether or not they can be reckoned among the division of causes.[20] The following chap. starts by: First then we observe that some things always come to pass in the same way, and others for the most part. It is clearly of neither of these that chance is said to be the cause, nor can the effect of chance be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always, or for the most part. This and similar passages in these chapters must be what people have taken as expressing the principle, What is true as a matter of coincidence cannot occur always or frequentlyâ„ ¢. But a careful examination of these passages will leave no doubt that what Aristotle has intended here is not a principle from which one can infer individual inductive laws. his thesis about language has been turned into a thesis about the world. He continues, however, not only have there been some philosophers who have mentioned chance among the causes, but there is, he reports, a further circumstance that is surprising: people often speak of events that occur by chance. He writes: Many things both come to be and are by chance and spontaneity, and although they know that each of them can be ascribed to some cause ¦nevertheless they speak of some of these things as happening by chance and others not.[21] Elsewhere, but in the same connection, Aristotle mentions as a case of chance the example of a man who, coming by chanceâ„ ¢ into the market and finding there a man whom one wanted, but did not expect to meetâ„ ¢.[22] In this circumstance the meeting of the man is described as a chance event. Now the surprising circumstance, according to Aristotle, is that while some people believe that the meeting of the man is not due to chance, yet people often speak of that event as happening by chance. Aristotle thus sets out to analyze the circumstances under which an event is said to be happening by chanceâ„ ¢. The first characteristic he identifies as required for an event to be described as happening by chanceâ„ ¢ is that it should not come to pass by necessity, always or for the most part. Thus he is referring here to a necessary condition under which the expression by chanceâ„ ¢ or its equivalents can apply. If the condition does not obtain, the expression is no longer applicable. If the man who went to the market had met the other man there always or frequently, that particular instance of meeting him would not have been characterized as a matter of coincidenceâ„ ¢, or as occurring by chanceâ„ ¢. Stating these necessary conditions for the application of the term the effect of chanceâ„ ¢ seems to be all that Aristotle has in mind when he says, nor can the effect of chanceâ„ ¢ be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always, or for the most partâ„ ¢. From this I conclude that Aristotleâ„ ¢s statement is not to be taken to imply that if the circumstance is not of the type to which the expression the effect of chanceâ„ ¢ is applicable, then there is a necessary or causal connection involved in that circumstance. On the contrary, it seems fairly clear that the statement in question describes one of the conditions Aristotle has found necessary for describing an event as happening by chanceâ„ ¢. If this is correct then the principle cannot be used as a ground for justification of inductive generalization. There is yet another condition in this theory to be satisfied, if an event is to be described as happening by chanceâ„ ¢. It must belong to the class of events, [I]n connexion with which the phrase for the sake of something is applicable. (Events that are for the sake of something include whatever may be done as a result of thought or of nature).[23] Thus, according to Aristotle, where both conditions apply the event is said to be happening by chanceâ„ ¢. This means that if the second condition were not satisfied the phrase would not be applicable. That is, it may be that an event is infrequent and rare, and yet not referred to as coming about by chance. From what we have said it is, however, clear that the statement What is true as a matter of coincidence cannot occur always or frequentlyâ„ ¢ as it is used by Aristotle is different from that statement as it used by Avicenna. Avicenna wants to employ the statement as a principle underlying our inductive reasoning, and as a ground for establishing the existence of a necessary connection among events that occur always or frequently in a determinate manner. And this is not, as we have observed, the way in which Aristotle uses the principle. When he said due to chanceâ„ ¢ could not be said of the events that occur frequently, what he meant was that when any course of events occurs frequently it can no longer be characterized accidentally. Thus, the principle in question concerns not the presence of a necessary connection, but rather the use of the expression by chanceâ„ ¢ or accidentally. To use that statement for establishing the existence of a causal connection seems to invol ve a misinterpretation of an Aristotelian thesis that is about language as a thesis about the world. Acknowledgement It is a pleasure to record my thanks to Professor Paul Thom and Professor Frank Jackson of ANU who, commented on an early draft of this paper, and to the University of Isfahan that supported the research. References Al-Farabi, (1985/86). Al-Mantiq inda l-Farabi, edited by R. Al-Ajam, 3 vols. Beirut. Aristotle, (1928) Posterior Analytics, translated by G. R. G. Mure, under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press. Aristotle, (1928) Prior Analytics, translated by A.J. Jenkinson, under the editorship of W.D. Ross, Oxford University Press. Aristotle, (1928) Topics, translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press Aristotle, (1930) Physics, translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press. Avicenna, (1956) Al-Shifa: AI-Mantiq. AI-Burhan(Demonstration), Cairo, edited by A. E. Afifi, Cairo. Avicenna, (1964) Al-Shifa, AI-Tabiâ„ ¢yyat (Physics), edited by Sa`id Zayed, Cairo. Avicenna, (1971) Al-lsharat wal-Tanbihat, with Tusiâ„ ¢s Commentary in Margin, edited by S. Dunya, 4 vols., Cairo. Avicenna, (1971) Avicennaâ„ ¢s Treatise on Logic, translated by F. Zabeeh, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Avicenna, (1984) Remarks and Admonitions: Part One: Logic, translated by S. C. Inati, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, Canada. Avicenna, (1985) Al-Najat, edited by M. T. Daneshpazhooh, Tehran University Press, Tehran. Ayer, A. J. (1972) Probability and Evidence, Macmillan. Cohen, L.J. and Hesse, M. (eds.) (1980) Applications of Inductive Logic, Oxford, Gohlman, W. E. (1974) The Life of Ibn Sina, Albany: SUNY Press Claredon Press. Hume, D. (1955) A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby Bigge, L. A. Oxford. Weinberg, J. R. (1965) Abstraction, Relation, and Induction, University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsine [1] Avicenna ( Ibn Sina ) lived from 980-1037 AD. For further information on his life, see Gohlman, W. E. (1974). For a detailed discussion of Avicennaâ„ ¢s influence upon Mediaeval philosophers, see Weinberg, J. R. 1965, chap. iii. [2] AL-ajam, R. 1`985/86, Vol. 3 , p. 100. [3] See Cohen, L.J. Hesse, M. 1980, p. viii. [4] See also, Avicenna, 1985, p. 5,: Avicenna, 1984, p. 129,: Avicenna, 1964, p. 557. [5] The translation is made by the author from the Persian original. Also cf F. Zabeeh, 1971, p. 25. Similar remarks can be found in Avicenna, 1984, p. 129. [6] In al-Shifa, he refers to this deduction simply as deduction but in a later work, al-Isharat, he also adds the adjective concealed (or imperceived), perhaps to distinguish it from enthymeme. [7] Avicenna, 1956, p. 95, ff. All my translations into Englishare are made from this edition. [8] It must, however, be said that his last work, Isharat does not support the principle and allows for unrealized possibilities. [9] Avicenna, 1956, p. 97. [10] Avicenna, 1956, p. 97. [11] Avicenna, 1956, p. 96. [12] Avicenna, 1956, p. 97. [13] Avicenna, 1956, p. 96. [14] For a servey of Inductive support for induction see Induction by Max Black, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Paul Edwaqrds, 1986. [15] Avicenna, 1956, p. 96. [16] Avicenna, 1956, p. 97. [17] Ayer, 1972, pp. 20-1. [18] Ibid., p. 21. [19] Avicenna, 1956, p. 96. [20] Physics, II, 4, 196b 8-9. [21] Physics, II, 4, 196a 12-14. [22] Physics, II, 4, 196a 2-4. [23] Physics, II, 5, 196b 21-23.

A Clockwork Orange Essays

A Clockwork Orange Essays A Clockwork Orange Essay A Clockwork Orange Essay Later on In the film Alex gets arrested and put In prison. From there he volunteers to take part In a few experiments that will help condition him to turn from his violent ways. One experiment that is performed on Alex is an example of Aversion Therapy. Aversion Therapy is when a noxious or painful stimulation is applied while the patient behaves in the undesirable manner or is exposed and responding to stimulation associated with the symptom, and is discontinued when the behavior ceases or the relevant stimuli are removed (Jones, 1964). In this movie Aversion Therapy was portrayed when psychologists gave Alex a shot of experimental serum while forcing him to watch violent and disturbing images of things that he was involved in before he got arrested. The serum made Alex very sick while watching these images which later impacted the way he chose to live his life after he was cured. This is an example of Aversion Therapy. Whenever Alex was faced with a situation that involved violence he became sick which stopped him from being violent. Now although Aversion Therapy seemed to be A Clockwork Orange 3 successful at this point in the movie, it soon drove Alex crazy once he was set free and almost lead to his suicide. Alex was faced with many instances where because of his Aversion Therapy he became sick at even the thought of violence. The sickness became too great at one point and pushed Alex over the edge which made him jump out of a window, unfortunately not ending his life. This shows that in some ways Aversion Therapy can work and can cure someone of their illness, but on the other hand too much Aversion Therapy can really drive someone Insane! Human nature has long since been in question. Alex is an extremely interesting character. He is a brutal human being who evolves as a character only to fall back into his original state. Its almost as humans are a blank slate. They are subject to the environment around them and they are molded by that environment. Alex longs for power. When he has it, he wants more. Alex has an almost dictatorial presence about him. He lives a life with no discipline and unfortunately suffers the consequences. His longing for power leads to his downfall and horrific rehabilitation. Alex undergoes a terrifying reconditioning. Alex is strapped to a chair, drugged, and tortured. He is subject to the oppressive government in which he lives. Ales life takes a complete 180. Instead of being powerful, he is now powerless. Although Ales wrong doing is taken to an unimaginable extent, does he have the choice to be bad? Is the conditioning that he experiences morally right? Can people take away his free will? Free will, defined as freedom of action by Roy F. Bandmaster, is a central focus of Anthony Burgess A Clockwork Orange. Burgess decides to take a character who is, by most moral standards, evil, and transform him into the protagonist. At points in the novel, a reader forgets the horrific things that he does, and begins to feel sorry for him and the torture that he is experiencing. Alex is a tool of the government, manipulated into the person that they want him to be. He is horrifically brutalized. All of his free will is taken away. Alex is classically conditioned through the use off special drug. This drug causes him to become violently ill when witnessing, or even hinging about, violence, and specifically Ludwig Van, 9th symphony, 4th movement causes a big reaction. The conditioning was successful, and they then proceeded to release Alex back into the real world, where Alex is helpless due to his conditioning. The argument that Burgess is trying to make has nothing to do with Ales actions (Newman, Bobby 63). He is arguing that the higher power should not be allowed to take away a persons free will, no matter what their actions are. Free will is human right, that we all share. The relevance of A Clockwork Orange has not changed over time. Its principles still spark debate and discussion today as we evaluate the society that we live in. Free Will In Scientific Psychology) Free will has a relation the Anthony Burgesss title A Clockwork Orange. The mass, location and velocities of the planets as they travel in their orbits around the sun determine where they will be in a thousand, a million or a billion years from today, provided only that all the forces acting on them are properly accounted for. I en unless, once set In mouton, runs Its course Inex orably, Like a clockwork (K Just like how the universe has a course made for it, so does Alex. His life was like a clockwork, Just running its course. Much of our life is already determined for us. We are either helped or hurt by a great variety of factors. Race, class, ability, gender, and many more contribute greatly to what we can and cannot do. It is an unfortunate reality, and much more complex than Ales. Much of what we do now, right or wrong, is unconscious. We evaluate what is beneficiary to the betterment of the individual. The dynamic of our society has created this behavior. We are subject to, and targeted for a number of uncontrollable things. Alex had control over the things that he was doing, and then it was taken away from him. We have very limited control over what we do because society takes our free will away. Behaviorism has a relation to free will. Watson view on behaviorism is Psychology should embrace behavior as its subject matter and rely on experimental observation of that subject matter as its method (Moore 451). Also Watson published his paper Psychology as the Behaviorism Views It, and in this paper he states: Psychology as the behaviorism views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness (Harlem 6) the prediction Watson set the stage for behaviorism, which soon rose to dominate psychology. Watson went a little overboard in that paper. But on the good side, he attracted many enthusiastic followers, became the national interest, made headlines in national newspapers, and was the subject of many articles in popular periodicals. But then there were troubles that Watson experiment wasnt considered Science (Behaviorism For the New Psychology) Regarding A Clockwork Orange, would such a conditioning process really work? Even though whenever Alex was surrounded by violence he would get nausea, over time that would start to disappear due to the violence being to minor, or Just the fact that he would get used to the sickness. We never really know how Alex becomes De- conditioned. Alex has dreams of dirty water taken out of his body, and clean water being added, but thats as much as we get. While Alex was recovering from an attempted suicide, lying unconscious in a hospital bed, somehow the conditioning process was reversed. Even though it seems like Burgess consistency with the effectiveness of behavioral interventions didnt follow regulations, it seems as if he wanted to make a comparison with the way the government is in our lives. A Clockwork Orange is much less about violence and more Burgess reflection and evaluation on his own society. It is an extremely different and unique approach that he decides to take, and for a lot of people it is ineffective. Readers are disturbed by the graphic violence rather than sparked by his overall message. What Burgess is trying to do is show growth in a character and hope that one can change, but is masked Day ten Truculently secretive text Burgess Imagined Torture AT a torn state, decimated by violence and oppression, grabs a reader and truly changes them. It is hard to imagine that one will forget that they read A Clockwork Orange, but for the wrong reasons. Rather than recall the novels foundation, one will remember the aesthetics and how it was portrayed. ( Burgess and Behavioral Interventions) Free will was introduced from the beginning of the novella. From the first line of the book Whats it going to be then eh? demonstrating how Alex and his friends were free to do anything, to the title of the book being compared to the clockwork of the earth. (Burgess 1). The belief of being conditioned is sometimes hard to believe. Even though it is somewhat possible, it could only be taken so far. Trying to change the way Alex sees violence wasnt an easy process. Even though it might of worked, it couldnt of lasted forever. Bandmaster, Roy F. Free Will In Scientific Psychology.

Canadian politics Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words

Canadian politics - Essay Example According to proponents of reforms, the way in which the system operates now. With twenty?four senators per region plus six assigned to Newfoundland and Labrador; does not reflect the political reality of contemporary Canadian federal relations. Of these one is for the Northwest Territories i.e. Yukon and Nunavut. These senators are appointed by the prime minister to serve until the age of seventy?five as per the current constitution. This arrangement of the upper house has never gone down well with Prime Minister Harper and together with the conservatives has always wanted to reform the senate in order to make it more efficient. These he advocates through the policy of the triple E that stands for equal, elected and effective. However, Harper keeps following the tradition of patronage that he so criticized while in the opposition. His government has tried severally to pass bills that do limit the tenure of senators to between 8 and 12 years through the introductions of bills that al so provide a legislative frame work for the election of senators. These efforts were to form the basis for the governor general appointment of new senators on the advice of the prime minister. These bills were unsuccessfully introduced by his government seven times in the 39th and 40th parliament but did not sail through as the conservatives were a minority in the house at the time. In the 41st parliament, Mr. Harper had a majority in the house hence the agenda to reform the senate was introduced through two previous bills that were now introduced as one i.e. Bill C-7, the senate reform act. This bill sort to reform the selection of senators and set there were term limits by amending of the constitutional act of 1867. The assumption was that since the conservative had now a majority in the house this bill will surely pass. Note that the Canadian parliament has powers bestowed to it to amend parts of the constitution that exclusively fall within its jurisdiction. The bill intended to achieve this through legislation and both parts of the bill were indeed inline with the Constitution Act of 1982. It was therefore constitutional in principle (Thompson 64). The bill however did not pass into law due to pertinent issues that were raised by the opposition and this goad the prime minister through the governor general to seek guidance from the court concerning the matter. There were two contentious issues, one relating to the framework to be used for electing nominees for senate appointments from the province. This concerned matters relating to recommendation for senate nominees to the governor general from a list from the provinces or territories. This list is for those who will have been elected through an election held inline with the provincial or territorial laws drawn in accordance with the framework. The second was the pertinent issue about the tenure of the senators to a one off nine year limit. The nature of the Canadian parliament from the past is that senat ors have generally been in office for an average period of between 9.7 years since 1975. Therefore, the provision in Bill C-7 was to limit the tenure of senators to a one term of 9 years would in a real sense have no political or constitutional effect per see (Thompson 96). Thus, the character of the parliament would roughly remain the same. However section 29A right up to 31 of the constitution states that a person referred to in subsection (1) whose term is interrupted may be summoned again to